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A NEW TRIBUNAL OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IVAN C. RUTLEDGE*

AN

part of the business of the state of Washington
is the insurance of employees against industrial accident and
disease. The premiums paid by employers covered by the industrial
insurance laws now support awards for disability and death amounting
to some eleven million dollars a year. The attorney general employs
ten or twelve attorneys full time to represent the state in cases involving the Department of Labor and Industries. Not counting the expense
borne by the courts, the 1951 legislature appropriated approximately
$868,000 for litigation costs for the biennium. A new state agency
has been created to review the decisions of the Department of Labor
and Industries in the hope of remedying some of the difficulties that
had arisen under prior regimes.
The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals was created in 1949'
as an independent tribunal, appointed by the governor and consisting
of three members selected from labor, industry, and the public respectively. Before the creation of this board, the Department of Labor
and Industries, which is in effect the insurance company, adjusted its
own claims, subject to review by the- superior courts. This system
reflected the policy established in 19112 of giving the workman "sure
and certain relief," in place of his "uncertain, slow, and inadequate"
common law remedy in the courts, based on the fault of the employer.
In the history of administration by the department there were two
periods, divided by the year 1927. The act of 1911 created an Industrial Insurance Department, consisting of three commissioners. The
injured workman could appeal from their decision to the courts.' The
Administrative Code of 1921 replaced the commissioners with the
Department of Labor and Industries and established within it a committee called the "joint board."4 In 1927 this committee, consisting of
the Director of Labor and Industries and two of his subordinates, was
given the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear cases arising within
the department.5 Thus all industrial insurance matters were channeled
IMPORTANT

*Assistant Professor of Law, UniVersity of Washington.
1 Wash. Laws 1949, c. 219; REm. SupP. § 10837-1.
2 Wash. Laws 1911, c. 74; REm. REv. STAT. § 7673.
3 Parker v. Ind. Ins. Dept., 102 Wash. 54, 172 Pac. 830 (1918).
4 Wash. Laws 1921, c. 7, § 79.
5 Wash. Laws 1927, c. 310, § 8.
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through this committee on the way to the courts. The new independent
board created by the 1949 legislation takes the place of this departmental committee as the screen through which cases pass from the
department to the superior court.
To see the reasons for abolishing the departmental hearing (or "rehearing," as it was called) and establishing an independent tribunal,
it is useful to outline briefly the departmental procedure that existed
from 1927 to 1949. The Supervisor of Industrial Insurance made ex
parte determinations of claims, based on reports to him from physicians
and other investigators. The beneficiary or workman could then obtain
a hearing before the "joint board" on which the supervisor sat, along
with the departmental supervisor of safety and the director, who is
the administrative superior of the other two. This committee had
been given the responsibility of deciding by majority vote "all matters
arising in" the divisions of industrial insurance and safety that any
of the three should "deem to be of sufficient importance to require
their joint action."6 At the hearing the testimony had to be sworn
and the joint board had to act upon evidence properly made a part of
the record before it.7 Thus it may be seen that although this committee
was an administrative council of the department, its procedure was
quasi-judicial. It will also be observed that this system produced an
example of a "defendant-judge" combination, rather than the prosecutor-judge combination that has been under criticism by the courts
and legislatures in recent years. The dissatisfied workman, before
going to the court, had to submit his contentions to a tribunal consisting of an officer who had just passed on his claim adversely, the administrative chief of that officer, and another of the subordinates of
that chief.
The conduct of the hearing could be committed to a departmental
employee after 1929, but the three departmental officers had to consider the record of the hearing and make the decision.' Thus the workman might not have an opportunity to appear in person before either
the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance or the committee who made the
decision. Furthermore, after 1927 the workman could not testify in
the superior court because the review was confined to the departmental
hearing record.' In such cases the only adjudicator before whom he
6

Supra, note 4.
Sweitzer v. Department of Labor and Industries, 177 Wash. 28, 36, 30 P.(2d) 50
(1934).
8 Wash. Laws 1929, c. 132, § 6.
0 Supra,note 5.
7
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would testify would be the departmental employee appointed to hold
the hearing. No special qualifications were prescribed for the persons
so designated.
Two years have elapsed since that hearing was abolished and a new
agency created to hold such hearings. In its first report ° to the legislature the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals described the kind of
problems presented by its inheritance of most of the statutory provisions, personnel, and habits of the people accustomed to deal with
the department. That report is the primary occasion for this study
and has supplied practically all of the information upon which it is
based." The report is an exceptional document for students of administrative law, and can almost be described as required reading for an
attorney who desires to initiate himself into a familiarity with the
administration of workmen's compensation in Washington.
The most conspicuous problem was that of litigious delay. The board
says that although the department could act judicially, in fact from
23 to 56 per cent of its cases were settled by compromise, and the committee or "joint board" was thus acting administratively. This figure
does not take into account the settlements made within the division of
industrial insurance, before quasi-judicial procedure was initiated or
after it was discontinued. The board further records that between
1942 and 1950 the number of cases to be heard by the department
carried over from the previous year rose from 274 in 1942 to 1382 in
1950 in a steady progression (with a negligible exception in 1949).
The process of administrative settlement was inadequate to stem the
flood of contested cases.
"It was the practice of the old joint board to try cases piecemeal.
Separate hearings were set for the claimant's case, the employer's case
and the department's case. Considerable time elapsed between the trial
of the various phases of the cases. More often than not the various
phases of the cases were heard by different examiners. Each phase,
accordingly, was often tried under different legal and factual theories.
Because of this confusion, cases were often incomplete in material
respects and the records were unduly complicated and confusing. .. "
This practice was inherited by the new board and natural resistance to
change resulted in a continuation of this practice. The board now noti10 First Biennial Report of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals of the State
of Washington, 1951.
11 The report is twenty-nine pages long. No specific reference will be made to the
page at which the information is found. Where not otherwise indicated, reference
should be made to the report for the source of material used here.
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fies the parties to the hearing with a form which bears the statement
"Each party hereto should be prepared to present his entire case at the
above time and place. Continuance will not be granted except for good
cause and upon application made prior to time of hearing.. .

."

Before

this substantial change in the old procedure was accomplished, however, the Whatcom County Bar Association passed a resolution of
November 16, 1950, which reads in part: "Whereas the members of the
Bar Association of Whatcom County have found, in the handling of
cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act, that extensive delays
and so-called 'split hearings' are frequently causing substantial injustices and inconvenience to their clients, IT IS HEREWITH RESOLVED
that this Association does herewith go on record as urging that all
reasonable and necessary steps be taken by the Department . . .and

the Board... to lessen the delays in the handling of Workmen's Compensation claims, although it is recognized that the Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals is still a relatively newly created agency and has
a present case load of approximately 1700 appeals. IT IS FURTHER
RESOLVED that this Association condemns the use of 'split' or adjourned
hearings, and urges the board.., to promulgate a rule requiring that,
except for due and sufficient cause shown, to prevent unreasonable
hardship, all interested parties . . .shall be required to prepare and

put on their evidence at a single hearing and in consecutive order in
the same manner as in trials in the Superior Court. . .

."

Whatever

the reasons that lay behind the practice of holding a number of sessions
to conduct a hearing under the departmental procedure, it is readily
inferable that this practice must bear some of the responsibility for
the increasing overhang of cases to be decided by hearing before the
department.
The following quotation from the report speaks for itself: "For
example in 1941 the joint board entered 339 appealable orders of
which eighty-six were appealed to the superior court. In 1948, the
joint board entered 455 appealable orders of which 328 were so
appealed. The percentage of appeals thus increased from 25 per cent
of 1941 orders to 72 per cent of 1948 orders. The percentage of reversals was keeping pace with the appeals. Numerically, fifty of the
cases decided by the board in 1941 were reversed, whereas 251 of those
decided in 1948 were reversed. Percentagewise, of the cases decided
in 1941 which were appealed to the superior court, 58 per cent were
reversed; of the cases decided in 1947 which were so appealed, 87
per cent were reversed. The marked success with which the orders of
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the board were reversed in superior court, of course, encouraged
appeals from the supervisor's orders. This situation together with a
rapidly growing working force within industry caused an ever accelerating increase in the number of such appeals. In 1941, 521 supervisor's
orders were appealed to the joint board, whereas in 1950, 879 orders
were so appealed, an increase of approximately 69 per cent. While
the case load was accelerating during the period from 1941 to 1950,
the numerical fluctuation of examiners was downward. In 1941, the
board had four examiners; in 1944, it had two only. During the
calendar year 1950, the board had 4.3 examiners. In every year except
1948, the new cases filed exceeded old cases completed. The case load
per examiner increased from 221 in 1942 to 574 in 1949." It should
be possible to conclude that the increasing working force in the state
of Washington, the practice of holding several sessions of a hearing
to decide a case, the decrease in the proportion of examiners to case
load, and the well-founded hope of obtaining a more favorable determination from the superior court, all combined to place the department in a very difficult position so far as affording the workman an
expeditious remedy was concerned.
In 1939 the appeals to the superior court were altered in several
respects. In most instances prior to that time the judge conducted a
de novo review of issues of fact, but the legislature decided to commit
these issues to the jury as a matter of right upon demand. 1 2 The
report of the board continues the story thus: "It was only natural
that in presenting their cases, attorneys appearing before the joint
board took the pragmatic, if somewhat cynical view, that ultimately
the case would be decided by a superior court jury and the cases were
tried with that in mind. Examinations and cross-examinations of
medical witnesses were carried on at length, not primarily to demonstrate to the board how and to what extent a workman was pathologically and physiologically disabled, facts which obviously must be
ascertained by the board to establish the compensable statutory percentage of disability, but rather to establish the legal conclusion of
compensable disability under the guise of medical testimony. To a
large extent the technique was to pit one doctor's legal conclusion of
statutory disability against another doctor's legal conclusion of statutory disability. Needless to say the board's hearings became games
of wit and the board's examiners were active participants therein."
12 Wash. Laws 1939, c. 184.
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The reference in the last sentence to the participation of the examiner
is thus explained: "Ostensibly these examiners were impartial hearings
officers whose sole legal purpose was to gather facts and make recommendations to the joint board, based upon the record made before
them. At the hearings claimants were usually represented by attorneys-in present proceedings before the board, claimants are represented by lawyers in 90 per cent of the cases and employers are
represented by lawyers in 15 per cent of the cases-who were making
a case not primarily to persuade the board, but to persuade a jury if
the case were appealed t6 the superior court. Since, as a practical
matter, however, no representative of the department other than the
examiner appeared at the hearings, it became necessary for the board's
examiners to present such evidence as the supervisor might have to
sustain his order; otherwise the case, if appealed to the superior court,
would go by default. Based upon the record, it was clear that approximately 70 per cent of the cases would be so appealed. The examiners
were thus in a dilemma. As a practical matter they became at once
impartial hearings officers and advocates for the department, by whom
they were hired and by whom they could be discharged. In order to
preserve the form of impartiality the examiners were unable to vigorously represent the department. On the other hand, to the extent they
did represent the department as advocates they ceased to be impartial."
The foregoing gives some clue to the dissatisfaction of workmen
and their beneficiaries with decisions of the joint board. The only
adjudicator they saw was a person who was in practical effect charged
with responsibility to the department for resisting the claim. Attending this appearance of injustice was the difficulty of understanding
the decision. "After the testimony was completed, the case was forwarded to the joint board for decision. When the decision was made,
the board entered its order. The order, itself, was a printed, stereotyped form with blank space left for the conclusion of the board. It
simply stated that the order of the supervisor was sustained or reversed. In the latter case the order was remanded, either for adjustment of the award or for further administrative action, as the case
might be. The order, itself, contained no recital of facts found by the
board; nor did it contain a statement of the basis upon which the board
reached its conclusion. It was impossible for a person who was not a
member of the board or its staff to ascertain what facts were found
by the board and what portion of the record persuaded the board to
reach its conclusion. In view of the confusion that existed in most
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records, as well as the nature of the board's order, it is difficult to
comprehend how superior court judges and juries were able to intelligently review the board's orders on appeal. In a large measure this
accounts for the high percentage of cases appealed to the superior
court in 1947 and 1948, as well as the high percentage of reversals
in the cases so appealed."
Whatever the reasons for the accelerating trend of appeals to the
superior court and the staggering backlog of undecided cases upon
which a workman or a beneficiary or employer had requested a departmental hearing, the transfer of the quasi-judicial function to the new
independent agency drastically altered the nature of the problems
that had previously faced the department and now had to be handled
by the new board. No longer were the triers of fact, or any one of
them, familiar with the facts in the case, either personally or through
their administrative subordinates and employees, prior to the hearing.
The case came to them through an initiating document, called a
notice of appeal, which set forth the grounds upon which the person
appealing considered the decision of the department to be wrong.
Only that complaint and the order of the department was before the
board, and the decision of the board was to be based upon a subsequent
hearing at which the proceedings started anew.
The departmental technique of administrative settlement was of
doubtful validity in the minds of the board. Quoting from the report:
"The legislation creating the board required it to hold hearings and
decide cases on the basis of sworn testimony, stenographically transcribed. The old joint board, on the other hand, was able to dispose
of from 23 per cent to 56 per cent of its final orders by compromise.
This, of course, had the result of reducing the number of hearings.
Since the creation of this board, however, virtually no cases have been
disposed of administratively by compromise. It is true that during
1950, 164 cases were disposed of by stipulation of all interested parties,
including the claimant, the employer and the department. These stipulations, however, were not initiated by the board since it lacks the
power to do so." In the meantime the legislature has clarified the
powers of the Board of Industrial Insurance appeals on this score.
The board may dispose of the case upon agreement of the parties if it
finds such agreement to be "in conformity with the law and the
facts." The same act provides for the board to initiate such disposi"3Wash. Laws 1951, c. 225, § 10.
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tion by calling conferences to reach such agreements, or to simplify.
the course of the hearing in case agreement cannot be obtained.
The new agency had difficulty eliminating the dual function of the
hearing officer as examiner and as representative of the department.
The board asked the department to furnish representatives to appear
in the board's proceedings and to present such facts as it deemed
necessary 'to support the supervisor's order. "Quite understandably,
perhaps, this request was not readily accepted by the department. Its
practical experience had been with the old joint board. The department
felt that, since the law creating the industrial insurance appeals board
provided that it succeeded to the powers of the old joint board, the
new board automatically would carry out the procedures of the old
board, which acted administratively, as well as quasi-judicially. In
addition the department took the position that the board was obligated to pay the witness fees of medical witnesses who appeared to
support the supervisor's order and in opposition to appellants at the
board level. Since the board could not reconcile this position with
the concept of an impartial quasi-judicial board, it took the position
that it would be unlawful for it to pay such fees. Numerous conferences
were scheduled with the department at which the entire law was
re-examined. Finally... the board unequivocally refused to pay the
witness fees of medical experts who appeared on behalf of the department. . . . After a conference with the governor, a meeting was
arranged between the governor's administrative assistant, members of
the board, representatives of the Department of Labor and Industries
and the attorney general. As the result of this conference and an
opinion of the attorney general, 4 it was decided that the board of
industrial insurance appeals was purely a quasi-judicial body and that
the Department of Labor and Industries would be represented in hearings before the board by members of the attorney general's staff. Thus
the board's examiners were relieved of the obligation of being advocates for the department and they were able to assume a purely impartial role. This change, however, was not accomplished in practice until
approximately February 1, 1950."
This policy of pursuing the very appearance of impartiality, as well
as conforming with the policy of the statute creating an independent
agency, is illustrated by these further observations concerning the
procedure of the board: "To assure that the board would consider only
1- Text, infra, pp. 13-14.
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the record made before the board's examiner, the departmental files
in cases on appeal were turned over to members of the attorney general's staff and the board in making its decisions does not consider any
part of the departmental record unless some portion thereof is properly
offered in evidence and made a part of the record before the board.
Hearings before the board are de novo. The board is not concerned
with why the supervisor entered his order. It considers the case as
if no order, in fact, had been entered by the supervisor and the board
decides, solely on the basis of the record made before it, what the
disability award should be."
Growing out of the controversy between the board and the department was an opinion of the attorney general of November 30, 1949,
that essentially confirms the position of the board. It reads in part as
follows:
While chapter 219, Laws of 1949, transferred the review and appeal
powers of the Joint Board to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
and conferred upon it the appellate jurisdiction formerly vested in the
Joint Board, at that point all similarity ends. The new board was created
to act entirely independent of the Department of Labor & Industries.
It was the intent of the legislature to establish an impartial quasi-judicial
tribunal to hear appeals from orders entered by the Department with
respect to industrial insurance. Unlike regulatory bodies, the Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals is not a party to its own proceedings; nor may
it initiate proceedings on its own motion, hence it is in no sense a party
litigant either in its own forum or in the superior and Supreme Courts
on appeal, as in the case of many regulatory bodies. The parties litigant
before the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals are the claimant, the
employer, and the Department of Labor and Industries.
An independent tribunal in its own right, it is clear that the Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals cannot be made responsible for costs or
expenses upon appeal nor for witness fees, as these items are throughout
our judicial system borne by the litigants. It is therefore our opinion that
the appropriation contained in chapter 219, Laws of 1949, was designed
and intended to meet the expenses which would be incurred in the administration and operation of an intermediate trial board.
On the other hand, the Department of Labor and Industries is a party
litigant. The 1949 enactment . . .specifically provides that "the department shall be entitled to appear in all proceedings before the Board and
introduce testimony in support of its order." . . . The act further provides .. .that upon any appeal being taken from an order of the Department of Labor and Industries or from an order of the Board the appellant
must serve upon the Director of Labor and Industries a notice of appeal.
The department by statute, is thus entitled to notice of appeal as is any other
party litigant.
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If the opinion of the attorney general may be regarded as an
accurate description of the effect of the 1949 legislation, there are four

levels of decision-makers in the process of administering claims of
injured workmen, and at the top three levels the determination is
judicial. These levels are successively the department, board, superior

court, and supreme court. First the department acts administratively,
either ex parte or in contested cases by negotiation and settlement.
Then the board may receive the case by appeal, but the proceeding is
not a review; the matter comes on for hearing completely de novo.

Then the superior court may receive the case by appeal. In the
superior court the trial, as under the former procedure, is held on the

basis of a transcript of testimony. No witnesses appear before the
jury." The current provisions are: "Upon appeals to the superior
court only such issues of law or fact may be raised as were properly
included in the notice of appeal to the board, or in the complete record
of the proceedings before the board. The hearing in the superior court
shall be de novo, but the court shall not receive evidence or testimony
other than, or in addition to, that offered before the board. . .. In
all court proceedings . . . the findings and decisions of the board

shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the
party attacking the same.""6 The verdict of the jury has the same
force and effect as in actions at law." Thus the legislature has made
the traditional common law allocation of decisional functions as between judge and jury, both in the superior court and the supreme court.
In sum, the department makes the final decision unless contested,"8
but this order may be contested before the board, where the proceedings are completely de novo. The determination of the board is subject
to review in the superior court, where the attacking party has the
burden of proof, but the trial is de novo on the record and may be
submitted to the jury. The supreme court review is conditioned by
the effect of a valid verdict as at common law. The "expeditious
remedy" in place of the common law tort liability of an employer may
involve two trials of the facts instead of one. One of them is by witnesses, the other by the record of the first hearing. There are three
stages at which issues of law may be joined, the board, the superior
15 The language of the statute remained the same in the 1949 amendment: "On such
appeal the hearing shall be de novo but... the court shall not receive... evidence ...
in addition to that offered before . . . the board (or the old 'joint board')." Wash.
Laws 1943, c. 280, § 1; Wash. Laws 1949, c. 219, § 6; Rsm. Sup,. § 7697.
16 Wash. Laws 1951, c. 225, § 15.
17 Id.

This provision has remained the same since 1939. REM. SuM. § 7697-2.
IsKuhnle v. Dept., 15 Wn. (2d) 427, 130 P. (2d) 1047 (1942).
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court, and the supreme court.
Another classification in the decisional process in these cases besides
the distinction between issues of law and fact is of great importance.
That is the difference between facts adducible by lay testimony and
medical opinion. "I grant that if Matters arise in our Law which concern other Sciences or Faculties, we commonly apply for the Aid of
that Science or Faculty which it concerns. Which is an honorable and
commendable thing in our Law. For thereby it appears that we do not
despise all other Sciences but our own, but we approve of them and
encourage them as Things worthy of Commendation."'" As was said
in Hamilton v. R. Co.,2 "When the consequences of actions or of
combinations of circumstances may only be known by those familiar
with the subject, and cannot be understood by those not possessing
skill or peculiar knowledge thereof, opinions of experts are competent
evidence." And our court has said, "It is quite true that courts must
necessarily depend upon the evidence of experts in cases of this nature,
because ... courts are not experts in medicine, lumbering, agriculture,
mining, electricity. . . . It is also true that questions of whether a
given physical defect is ... caused by an impaired physical condition

must be determined from medical experts.""
However, there may be pitfalls in the use of expert opinion. The
report of the board certainly indicates that it has discovered difficulties
in managing it. "But the testimony elicited from the medical witnesses,
both on direct and cross examination, tended to emphasize the legal
conclusion of disability rather than the functional disability based
on pathological and physiological findings. Moreover, the same medical witnesses appeared before the board repeatedly. They became
trained in expressing the legal conclusion of disability in the language
of the statute, notwithstanding the fact that they lacked legal training
for an actual understanding of the substance of the statute itself or
the supreme court decisions interpreting it. .

.

.The trial technique

was largely to pit one doctor's legal conclusion of statutory disability
against another doctor's legal conclusion of disability. .

.

. It is the

thinking of the present board that the testimony of medical experts
should be limited to the facts of injury as to the pathological and
physiological disability resulting therefrom. Rather naively, perhaps,
this board is of the opinion that the medical witnesses should confine
19 Saunders, J., in Buckley v. Rice Thomas, 1 Plowd. 124 (1554).
20 36 Iowa 37 (1872).
21 See Tonkovich v. Dept., 31 Wn.(2d) 220, 195 P.(2d) 638 (1948).
In this case,
however, the court rejected the expert opinion.
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their opinion testimony to medical rather than to legal and vocational
matters. The purpose of medical testimony is to enlighten the board
concerning the nature and extent of the workman's pathological,
physiological and functional disability. These are the only matters
that fall within the medical witnesses' field of expertness and their
testimony should be limited thereto.... When the workman's pathological and functional disability has been determined, that disability,
logically, must be translated into vocational disability. Until that is
done, the board believes it is not possible to determine the legal disability provided by statute. Now medical experts, as such, generally
are not experts within the field of vocational disability. In enacting
chap. 219, Laws of 1949, the legislature foresaw the necessity of
considering the question of vocational disability. It accordingly provided for the appointment of a labor and an industry representative
on the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. In ascertaining vocational disability these two members occupy a unique position and
perform a necessary function. The labor representative, having as his
interest the welfare of workmen generally, gives careful consideration
to the question of how the traumatic disability testified to by medical
witnesses affects the workmen within the workshop. The industry
representative, with his background in personnel management, considers the same problem from the industry standpoint. Thus the board
considers the practical effect of the pathological disability as it affects
the workman in his every day work. It is believed that the lay members of the board are better qualified to pass judgment upon vocational
disability, once the pathological and functional disability is ascertained, than are medical witnesses or untrained juries.
"In any event, translating physical and pathological disability into
vocational disability and ultimately into compensable disability is the
administrative duty of the Department of Labor and Industries in the
first instance and thereafter of this board if the case is appealed to the
board. In the board's opinion, the determination thereof may not be
delegated to members of the medical profession as such. It is, in fact,
the issue before the department and before the board. Members of the
medical profession are not vocational experts or experts in personnel
management; nor are they public officials charged with administrative
or judicial functions under the act. Their opinions are advisory only,
and they invite searching analysis of the basis upon which they are
made."
The question will occur, why, if the opinions of the doctors are

208
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advisory only, permitting them to enter the record can work any harm.
The answer contained in the report is: "It is obvious, of course, that in
arguing to a jury it is easier for counsel to present a case in terms of
a doctor's conclusion, rather than in terms of pathology and physiological disability." Suspicion that abuses may have occurred in the
preparation and presentation of workmen's compensation cases is
generated by the following comment of the board: "The workman's
own physician, who generally knows his condition better than anyone
else, seldom is called as a witness, either by the claimant or the department. . . ." My own belief is that the net effect of the various amendments to the workmen's compensation statutes is to deprive the jury
of the demeanor evidence which is so useful to a trier of fact that
there ought to be good reasons for eliminating it. What is the necessity
for the procedure before the board as a prerequisite to superior court
adjudication of these cases? One answer is that implicit in the excerpt
from the report quoted above: The board is specially equipped to
translate the facts both lay and medical into terms of statutory disability. Another is the reduction of business before the superior courts.
However, relieving crowded superior court dockets is a vain hope if
the incidence of board cases appealed to the court is not reduced. If
the number of these appeals remains large, the only advantage is the
reduction of delay incident to getting parties and witnesses before
the superior court. If it is assumed that the reason for the existence of
the board is its specialized ability to determine complicated issues of
medical fact, the present system is topsy-turvy. It subjects the determination of a specialized tribunal to review by an unspecialized body,
the jury, which by hypothesis requires extensive assistance from
medical experts. The result is that the board may well complain that
it is required to listen to opinion that does not assist it in the performance of its duties for the sake of making a record that will provide a
foundation for an increased award of compensation regardless of the
merits of the case. At the same time the system deprives the jury of
the opportunity to judge by demeanor, both on direct and cross
examination, the comparative reliability of the determination by the
experts of the ultimate issue in the case, that is, the degree of disability. Reasonably enough, the jury is likely to select the estimate
most favorable to the injured workman, thus setting at naught any
special competency possessed by the members of the board or its
examiners.
In this posture of affairs, the hope of reducing the amount of court

A NEW TRIBUNAL OF WASHINGTON

209

litigation lies in developing the persuasive effect of the determinations
of the board. The following excerpt describes the efforts of the board
along this line: "After the record is completed, it is examined by the
board. In making its decision the board has adopted a rule of liberal
construction in favor of workmen. This is in line with the declared
purpose of the industrial insurance act itself as interpreted by the
supreme court. Where there is substantial conflict in credible testimony, doubts are resolved in favor of the injured workman. This is
not to say, however, that the decisions of the board are based upon
emotional considerations. The board insists that there be credible
testimony to support the claimed disability. It is believed, however,
that by the time the board's decision has been made, the injured workman has received every consideration that the facts in the record and
." The board explains how it drafts its opinions
the statute permit ....
and orders. In these orders are contained "carefully drawn findings
of fact . . . set forth in much the same manner as findings of fact
are made by superior courts in law cases. Following the findings of
fact is the board's order. It is the board's theory that the findings of
fact standing alone, if accepted as true, will support the legal conclusion contained in the order. The opinions and orders are drafted with
as much care, both from a factual and legal standpoint, as the case load
of the board permits. The board is attempting to pioneer its way in
this field. Admittedly, it started from humble beginnings. The board
believes, however, that the quality of the orders is constantly improving and that they will receive increasing respect from the courts. ...
The drafting of written orders compels clear thinking and analysis.
Moreover, the practice of drafting orders and setting forth therein,
not only the board's conclusion, but the facts and the law upon which
it is based, assures to parties appearing before the board that the
decisions are intellectually honest and based upon substantial considerations. Anything less would be a mere administrative fiat. Moreover, to the extent that the orders set forth the history of the case, and
the conclusion arrived at by the board, together with the factual and
legal reasons therefor, they should be of assistance to superior court
judges upon review. . . . The procedures instituted by the present
board are beginning to show their effects in reversing the trend of
appeals to the superior courts. As previously pointed out 73 per cent
of the appealable orders entered by the joint board in 1947 were
appealed to the superior court. The percentage of such appeals had
dropped to 47 per cent with respect to the appealable orders entered
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in 1950."
The legislature in 1951 followed up the practice of the board with
respect to its findings of fact and law by making two provisions.
One is:
Every final decision and order rendered by the board shall be in writing
and shall contain findings and conclusions as to each contested issue of fact
and law, as well as the board's order based thereon. In cases involving
injured workmen the findings and conclusions shall contain a concise
statement of the board's jurisdiction, the nature of the workman's injury,
the pathological condition, if any, resulting therefrom, the physiological
disability, if any, resulting from such pathological condition, and any other
material facts pertinent to the case, as well as the relief, including the
of disability, if any, to which the workman or benestatutory percentage
22
ficiary is entitled.

The other new provision is very significant: "Where [upon appeal
to the superior court] the court submits a case to the jury, the court
shall by instruction advise the jury of the exact findings of the board
on each material issue before the court."2 These two provisions constitute a basis for developing a coherent body of compensation law
in the state. If the findings as to law, made by the tribunal closest to
the problem, win the respect of the supreme court, the interaction of
court and agency in this field should produce a body of consistent and
carefully thought out interpretations of the statute. If the findings as
to fact are persuasive upon the juries called upon to review industrial
insurance cases, the benefit of the demeanor evidence available to the
board will be thus indirectly transmitted to the jury, and the provision
that "the findings and decision of the board shall be prima facie correct
24
and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same,"
will have real meaning.
One other problem, not touched upon at length by the biennial
report, is the formality of the proceedings in workmen's compensation
cases. The statutes provide for the new board, as they did for the old
departmental board, that the proceedings shall be informal and summary, both in the superior court and below at the administrative level.
Since 1939, when the parties were given the right to jury trial and the
verdict was given the effect of a common law verdict, the superior
22 Wash. Laws 1951, c. 225, § 13.
23 Wash. Laws 1951, c. 225, § 15.
24 Id. It will be recognized that the effect of the determination of the board as a
matter of law is crucial in the administration of the act. This problem, as yet an open
one in the interpretation of the new provisions, deserves considered study, which is not
here undertaken.
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court trial has of necessity been characterized by many of the formal
incidents of a trial as at common law. Likewise, the necessity of making
the administrative hearing the place at which the evidence is recorded
for a jury in a subsequent trial comes close to requiring that hearing
also to be managed by lawyers. Perhaps with this function of the board
in mind, the legislature provided that the chairman of the board, who
represents the public; must be a lawyer. Again, the possibility of jury
review tends to pervert the administrative proceedings by injecting
lawyers' squabbles over fine points of admissibility of evidence into a
hearing for which the niceties of the rules of evidence at common law
were not adapted. Were the chairman and the hearing officer not
lawyers, it might well happen that the jury would not be permitted
to hear much of the record on which the decision and findings of the
board were made. The informal conference previously referred to,
which the board is now empowered to initiate for the purpose of
obtaining stipulations disposing of the case or simplifying the hearing
of it, is a device that might be developed to minimize or make unnecessary expensive legal assistance in simple and meritorious cases.
The substantive law of the industrial insurance act needs clarification and its application made more consistent in case to case decision.
The burden of litigation in this field needs to be reduced. The time
spent disposing of contested cases needs to be minimized. If the
board is able to justify its existence, the superior court review in these
cases ought to be the exception rather than the rule. The extent to
which such review is de novo is a factor that militates against this
desirable result. However, if impartial and expeditious hearing before
the board can be provided and if the decisions of the board are such
as to persuade the parties in the case of the reasonableness of the
results reached, it may be hoped that the amount of court litigation
will be reduced. The report of the board after its first two years of
existence strengthens this hope.

